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SUBCHAPTER C OF THE
INTER.NAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
III. CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS
AND REORGANIZATIONS
The subject of corporate organizations and reorganiza-
tions is proverbially the most complicated in the revenue
laws. Intricate as the statutory provisions themselves are,
it is not in their literal application that the trouble lies,
forp with one or two exceptions, this involves little more
than the patient deciphering of precisely stated formulae;
almost all the problems originate in the requirement that
there must be compliance with the spirit as well as the
letter of the law. The margins of the statute are filled with
administrative and judicial gloss, which it is not possible
and would not be desirable entirely to eliminate. While we
may disagree with the standards of judgment employed in
devising particular tests or disposing of particular cases,
it is difficult to quarrel with the right to prevent perver-
sions of the statute.
Yet a special taxpayer problem exists in this field, in
the form of the practical necessity of obtaining advance
approval by the Bureau of proposed transactions. There-
fore, unfavorable Bureau interpretations, whether right
or wrong, have more pronounced in terrorem effects in
this area than in others, where the taxpayer is relatively
free or may be compelled by circumstances to act on his
own judgment and fight the matter out later, if need be.
The same is true of what may be no more than a narrow
ruling policy, set without reference to whether a serious
attempt would be made to attack certain types of trans-
actions which the Bureau is nevertheless not willing to en-
courage through advance approval.
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So taxpayers and their advisers continue to grumble at
the tyranny of the courts and the Bureau and to argue that
the law ought to be made so clear that there is no room for
interpretation. But as soon as there is a serious attempt to
substitute mechanical rules for judgment rules, as, for ex-
ample, relative to continuity of interest and business pur-
pose, they shy away. This is because it then becomes evi-
dent that the price of certainty is a narrowing of the scope
of permissible transactions. At once, as was said at the
start of this article, the need for greater flexibility is
stressed, and we return to the old set-up, with relatively
minor changes in isolated areas where special problems
capable of solution by rule of thumb have developed. The
unfortunate thing is that this experience has to be con-
stantly repeated. Presumably we are now at the trough,
but as the remembrance of the House Bill fades we are
sure to reach another peak with time. Nor is it to be sup-
posed that absolute mathematical certainty would be pos-
sible even if taxpayers were willing to pay the price. In
the very nature of the case, unless the policy of non-recog-
nition were abandoned entirely, no amount of mathemati-
cal precision in definition will prevent instances of literal
compliance from arising which the courts will feel they
must defeat in the interests of public morality. The ques-
tion is one of degree. Moreover, overparticularization
must always -fail, for no one knows enough to cover every
case that can arise.
After more than a generation of specific statutory enact-
ments on the subject of corporate organizations and re-
organizations little time and attention need be given to the
period prior to the Revenue Act of 1918, when the law
was silent. Some attempts were made administratively to
exclude a limited class of the property-for-stock or stock-
for-stock exchanges involved in this area from the cate-
gory of closed, or tax-generating, transactions, but it was
soon decided that the problem was too big for anything
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but a legislative solution. The story of these pre-historic
developments and the. case law, which, though forming
part of it, was handed down after the era of statutory
treatment had begun,' is well summarized elsewhere.2
The two classes of transactions-corporate organizations
and corporate reorganizations-involved in this part of
our subchapter C analysis are quite different in their
problems and the space devoted to them in the statute. A
corporate organization is the mere conversion of direct
ownership of property into indirect ownership, as upon
the incorporation of a sole proprietorship or a partnership.
A reorganization covers the broad field of the rearrange-
ment of businesses already in corporate form, such as by
merger, consolidation, division, migration of corporate
charter, or recapitalization. In certain instances there may
be an overlap between the two, but generally speaking
they are separate. Most of the complications and almost
all the evolution are to be found in the reorganization field,
where the possible variations and opportunities for manip-
ulation are virtually limitless as compared with the prob-
lems surrounding corporate organizations which, though
basic, are relatively few. Nevertheless, at first blush, es-
pecially if the opportunities for rigging are ignored and a
purely conceptual view is taken, there appears to be more
reason for treating business rearrangements as mere paper
transactions, at least from the shareholders' point of view,
where there is no change in their form of ownership, i.e.,
where the business is already in corporate form and re-
mains in corporate form after the various shifts have been
made, than there is where the comparatively radical
change from the status of direct owner of a business to the
status of shareholder is involved. At any rate, a non-rec-
1 United States v. Phellis, 257 US. 156 (1921); Rockefeller v. United
States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); Weiss
v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Marr v.'United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
2 Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 3 (3d Series 1940).
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ognition provision covering corporate organizations took
three years, or one revenue act, longer to appear in the tax
laws than did the first feebly articulated provision relative
to corporate reorganizations. And this is true despite the
fact that both problems were raised at the same time.
If either should have given Congress pause on the basis
of potential difficulties it should have been the one dealing
with reorganizations.
The subject of corporate organizations is covered by
Section 351' of the new Code. On the surface it does not
appear much different from its predecessor, Section
112 (b) (5) of the old Code, which ran back to the Revenue
Act of 1921,' and in the general run of cases its effect is
the same. What it provides is that where one or more
persons transfer property to a corporation in exchange
solely for its stock or securities and after such transfer are
in control of the corporation, no gain or loss is recognized
upon the exchange. If, in addition to the transferee cor-
poration's stock or securities, other property or money is
received, then, though loss will continue to be unrecog-
nized (a refinement overlooked until the Revenue Act of
1924'), gain, computed in the usual manner, i.e., by taking
into account the full value of all the consideration, includ-
ing the stock or securities, received, will be recognized,
but in an amount not exceeding the money and the fair
market value of the other property received.' Since, with
the exception of certain liquidation provisions discussed in
a previous installment of this article, non-recognition of
3 INT. RFv. CODE of 1954, § 351, 68A STAT. 111 (1954).
4 Revenue Act of 1921, § 202 (c) (3), 42 STAT. 230 (1921).
* Revenue Act of 1924, § 203 (f), 43 STAT. 257 (1924).
6 In the original 1921 enactment (section 202(e) ) gain was recognized
in these so-called "boot" cases only if and to the extent the money and fair
market value of the other property received, taken by themselves, exceeded
the basis of the property transferred, or, to put it another way, only to the
extent there would have been gain had the boot been the only consideration
received. This was corrected by Section 2 of the Act of March 4, 1923, effec-
tive January 1, 1923. Revenue Act of 1923, § 2, 42 STAT. 1560 (1923).
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gain or loss is theoretically tax postponement rather than
tax forgiveness, the transferors will take as their basis
of the stock and securities received the same basis as they
had in the property transferred, adjusted only for recog-
nized gain and money received,7 and the corporation will
take over the property at the same basis it had in the hands
of the transferors, increased only in the amount of gain
recognized to them.
The principal change in this provision as compared with
prior law is the elimination of the proportionate interest
test. Beginning with the first enactment in 1921 and con-
tinuing through all successive revenue acts including the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, it was required in the
case of multiple transferors that:'
... the amount of stock and securities received by each
[be] substantially in proportion to his interest in the property
prior to the exchange.
What the reason was for this long-continued rule is ob-
scure, though it could doubtless be rationalized along lines
similar to those in the loss-of-control cases where loss of
control is brought about by commitments to dispose of all
7 For this purpose, liabilities of the transferors assumed by the trans-
feree or subject to which the property is transferred are treated as money.
This is not true for purposes of recognition of gain, however, except in
the presence of a tax avoidance motive or the absence of a bona fide business
purpose or except where the liabilities in question exceed the basis of the
property. See Section 357. In the latter situation recognition of gain is
limited to the excess of the liabilities over the basis of the property, which
is different from the general boot rule and represents a return, under very
limited circumstances, to the original 1921 Act provision. This exception is
new in the 1954 Code and was enacted because of the practical impossibility
of effecting postponement by means of a minus basis. Under prior law such
gain escaped tax.
s IA. REV. CODE of 1939, § 112(b) (5), 53 STAT. 37 (1939). The exact
wording dates from Section 203 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT.
256, but Section 202 (c) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 230, was in
all essential respects the same. The unenacted clause in Section 202(b) of
the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STAT. 1060, would have provided simply for non-
recognition of gain or loss "when a person or persons owning property
receive in exchange for such property stock of a corporation formed to
take over such property." SEIDum'S LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INcomE
TAX LAws 1938-1861, 898 (1938).
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or part of the acquired stock or securities, as to which
more later. But, regardless of the reasons underlying the
requirement, it was productive of much controversy and
was often a trap for the unwary. Moreover, there were
two schools of thought concerning the proper method of
its application, which only added to the confusion. The
whole subject, starting out as a relatively simple concept-
became highly esoteric. Even the labels were confusing.
One approach, known as the relative-value test, measured
disproportionateness by comparing the extremes of devia-
tion in terms of adding the plus or minus percentages. The
other, known as the control test, added the plus or minus
percentage points. Let us assume two transferors, A and
B, and that A transfers 80 percent of the property for 72
percent of the stock and B 20 percent of the property for
28 percent of the stock. The advocates of the relative value
test would say that the deviation was 50 percent, composed
of a 10 percent deficiency in stock interest on the part of A
and a 40 percent excess on the part of B. To the advocates
of the control test, on the other hand, the deviation would
be only 16 percent, consisting of the 8 percentage points
A was below an amount equivalent to his interest in the
property and the 8 percentage points by which B exceeded
it. Passing the point of whether the transaction would not
fail under either test, there is obviously a wide difference.
Moreover, is there any reason why the matter should have
been allowed to turn on arithmetic alone in any event, as
opposed to an exercise of judgment after looking at the
transaction as a whole, the question being, was there a
pooling of properties, or a shifting of properties, or a sale?
The rationale of the new Code is that a proportionate
interest test is really irrelevant to the question of whether
gain or loss should be recognized in a corporate organiza-
tion. If any substantial shift in interests is really a gift
or compensation by one transferor to another or some-
thing else in disguise, it should be recognized and taxed as
(Vol. XXX
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such without invalidating the tax-free. nature of the prop-
erty-for-stock transaction. Where such an ulterior motive
is present, the transaction is reconstructed for what it is,
with all the usual tax consequences. For example, if the
excessive stock received by B in the illustration set forth
in the preceding paragraph was really compensation for
services performed by him for A, it would be deemed to
have been received first by A and then paid over to B, with
the result that not only would B be taxed on its fair mar-
ket value as compensation but A would be taxed on its dis-
position as though he had sold it for its fair market value.
One of the requirements of Section 351, as of all its
predecessors, is that the transferors must be in control of
the transferee corporation immediately after the exchange,
control being defined in Section 368 (c) 9 to mean owner-
ship of at least 80 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80
percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock. Where there is a prior -binding agreement to trans-
fer a portion of the stock immediately upon receipt and the
retained stock does not meet the control requirement, par-
ticularly where such agreement is part of the organization
plan, there is a question whether the control requirement
is satisfied.10 To make certain that, where one of the trans-
ferors is a corporation and it distributes the stock it re-
ceives to its shareholders, the transaction will not fail for
lack of control," the new Code provides a special rule, as
follows:
(c) Special Rule. - In determining control, for purposes of
this section, the fact that any corporate transferor distributes
part or all of the stock, which it. receives in the exchange
9 Th'r. REV. Coax of 1954, § 368 (c), 68A STAT. 121 (1954).
3-0 See. discussion of this subject in American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C.
397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
11 Section 351 sleaks of control in the transferor, not, like the corres-
ponding reorganization provision, of. control in the transferor or its share-
holders or both. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 351, 68A STAT. 111-12 (1954).
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to its shareholders shall not be taken into account.
This does not mean that the shareholders will receive the
stock tax-free, but merely that non-recognition will con-
tinue to be accorded at the transferor level. But how about
other disposition cases? Are any inferences to be drawn
from the fact that the statute covers distributions and not
other forms of disposition? And just how does the aban-
donment of the proportionate interest test, with the in-
junction that wrapping V4) other deals with the organiza-
tion transaction will not destroy non-recognition but mere-
ly cause the other deals to be taxed for what they are, fit
into the pattern? In our A and B example both parties were
property transferors, but suppose the facts had been that
all the stock received by B had been received as compensa-
tion for services rendered to A. Reconstruction of the
transaction would regard A as receiving all the stock for
property in the first instance, but would the fact that the
plan called for 28 percent to go to B, a non-transferor,
cause the transaction to fail? It is not believed that Con-
gress intended this.
At this point the exact meaning and effect of the sen-
tence, not found in prior law, that stock or securities is-
sued for services shall not be considered as issued for prop-
erty, is likewise of interest. This is not the type of case we
have just considered, but one where the corporation is is-
suing stock for services rendered or to be rendered to it.
According to the House Report,'2 the sentence is intended
merely to make certain that such stock will be fully tax-
able as compensation and its application is not to vitiate
-the remaining portion of the transaction. The Treasury's
proposed regulations" give as an example a case where
the individual being compensated is also a property trans-
feror, thereby avoiding the question of the effect of the
12 H.R. RPP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A117 (1954).
13 Proposed regulations under subchapter C, § 1.351-1(a) (2), Example
(3).
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issuance of such stock upon the'control requirement. But
suppose only 79 percent of the stock is issued to the prop-
erty transferors and 21 percent to a non-transferor as
compensation. It is difficult to see how the entire trans-
action will not be vitiated under such circumstances, de-
spite the Committee Report. Perhaps, though it is unlike-
ly and would seemingly be in the teeth of the statute, an
analogy could be drawn from the money transferor, to
whom the section is obviously inapplicable in any practi-
cal sense, but who is nevertheless regarded as a transferor
for purposes of the control test."4 So a participant who re-
ceives stock for services could, if the result is desired
strongly enough, be regarded as not being a property
transferor for purposes of himself obtaining non-recogni-
tion of gain, while still constituting a transferor for pur-
poses of the control test.
Coming now to reorganizations, perhaps the most con-
venient way to provide the necessary framework for the
subsequent discussion is to outline briefly the 1954 Code
provisions on the subject. These fall generally into two
categories: first, a listing of the types of corporate adjust-
ments covered, i.e., the definition of "reorganization", and
second, a spelling-out of the tax treatment to be accorded
the various exchanges and distributions effected pursuant
thereto.
In order to be a reorganization within the meaning of
the Code the transaction at the corporate level must be one
of six types 5 -(1) a statutory merger or consolidation;
(2) an acquisition of stock of one corporation by another
corporation solely for its voting stock, provided the ac-
quiring corporation has control after the transaction; (3)
the acquisition of at least 80 percent of the assets of one
corporation by another corporation for its own voting stock
14 Halliburton v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935).
15 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368 (a), 68A STAT. 120 (1954).
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or that of its parent; (4) the transfer of property by onecorporation to another corporation if, immediately after
the transaction, the transferor, or some or all of its share-
holders, or both are in control of the transferee and certain
distribution requirements are satisfied; (5) a recapitaliza-
tion; or (6) a mere change in identity, form, or place of in-
corporation, however effected. A party to a reorganiza-
tion is any corporation involved in one of the foregoing
transactions as a resulting corporation, an acquiring cor-
poration, a corporation the stock or property of which was
acquired, a recapitalized corporation, etc. 6
Qualification of the underlying transaction as a reorgan-
ization merely sets the stage for operation of the tax-free
exchange and distribution provisions which are separately
stated in the statute. These are of two kinds, those which
are directed to the corporate participants in the transac-
tion and those which are directed to the shareholders and
security holders. On the corporate side it is provided that
no gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation which
is a party to a reorganization exchanges property pursuant
to the reorganization plan for stock or securities in another
corporation a party to the reorganization, with suitable
provision for partial recognition of gain in boot cases to
the extent the boot is not distributed to shareholders. On
the shareholder side the situation is somewhat more com-
plicated. In general, exchanges of stock for stock and dis-
tributions of stock are tax-free, but exchanges of stock for
securities and distributions of securities are taxable. Se-
curity holders may exchange securities for securities tax-
free, except to the extent the principal amount of the se-
curities received exceeds the principal amount of those
surrendered. The receipt of boot will, of course, result in
a partial recognition of gain in any case. Moreover, recog-
nized gain, if it has the effect of a dividend, will be taxed
16 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368 (b), 68A STAT. i21 (1954).
[Vol. XXX
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as such rather than as a capital gain. To round out this
preliminary thumbnail sketch, it should also be added that,
in addition to permitting tax-free exchanges and distribu-
tions incident to a reorganization, these shareholder pro-
visions now for the first time cover spin-offs or split-offs
taking the form of distributing the stock of existing sub-
sidiaries.
The scheme, as has been mentioned before, is tax-post-
ponement, not tax forgiveness. Consequently, appropriate
basis rules are provided to preserve the unrecognized gain
or loss for future recognition. The shareholder keeps his
old basis, as do transferor corporations; transferee corpo-
rations take over the basis of their transferors. Thus, as-
suming no recognition of gain anywhere along the line on
account of boot, everyone and everything is in statu quo,
which is exactly what the statutory rules are intended to
accomplish.
Until the 1954 revision, the statutory definition of a re-
organization, except for the 1939 Act legislation to take
care of the Hendler case,' had remained unchanged for
twenty years. It was a far cry from the first enactment
in 1918, which merely provided for non-recognition of gain
or loss to shareholders or security holders who exchanged
their stock or securities for stock or securities of no greater
aggregate par or face value in a merger, consolidation, or
reorganization-without any attempt at definition. The
1921 Act, however, filled this void, in the following terms,
though it used the word "includes" rather than "means":1 8
The word "reorganization," as used in this paragraph [sec-
tion 202 (c) (2) ], includes a merger or consolidation (includ-
17 U.S. v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938). This case unexpectedly held that
assumptions of liabilities constituted other property or money, i.e., boot, and
aroused immediate consternation, not only that most reorganizations would
be blocked for the future and that many unanticipated tax liabilities had
been created, but also because, many taxpayers would claim a step-up in
basis on account of past transactions where gain'had not been recognized,
but should have been.
18 Revenue Act of 1921, .§ 202(c) (2), 42 STAT. 230 (1921).
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ing. the acquisionby one corporation of at least a majority of
the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation,
or of substantially all the properties of another corporation),
recapitalization, or mere change in identity, form, or place
of organization of a corporation, (however effected).
Section 203 (h) (1) " of the 1924 Act converted the defini-
tion into an exclusive one by substituting the word
"means" and added one more category, viz., control re-
organizations. In addition, there was a much more com-
plete articulation of the mechanics of non-recognition than
had been the case with the prior Act. The par or face
value approach had already been abandoned in the 1921
Act.
With only one important exception the reorganization
pattern adopted in the Revenue Act of 1924 remained sub-
stantially unchanged until the Revenue Act of 1934. That
exception related to basis of property in the hands of an
acquiring corporation. A carry-over basis was required
only where interest or control of 80 percent or more re-
mained in the same persons or any of them. If such in-
terest or control was less than 80 percent, basis was per-
mitted to be stepped up to fair market value. On the
ground that it was too easy to obtain temporary outside
capital of 21 percent merely for purposes of stepping up
basis, Section 113 (a) (7)20 of the Revenue Act of 1932
reduced the 80 percent test to 50 percent.
By the time the Revenue Act of 1934 was in the offing,
however, basic objections to postponing the recognition of
gain in corporate reorganizations, as well as other areas,
had developed. A strong recommendation for the complete
abolition of the tax-free exchange and reorganization pro-
visions was presented by a Ways and Means Subcommit-
tee on Prevention of Tax Avoidance, on the dual ground
1.9 Revenue Act of 1924, § 203 (h) (1), 43 STAT. 257 (1924).
20 Revenue Act of .1932, § 113(a) (7), 47 SmAT. 198 (1932)'.
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that it would close the door to one of the most prevalent
methods of tax avoidance and would simplify the income
tax law by eliminating some of its most complicated pro-
visions. A Joint Committee Staff memorandum, included
as an exhibit, supplied considerable ammunition in the
form of a list of horror. cases. But the Treasury objected,
partly for fear that, under depression conditions, the im-
mediate result would be a flood of deductible losses rather
than'taxable gains. It was argued that it might be. better
to attempt to remedy the situation, not by repeal, but by
making the statute less rigid, and giving the Commissioner
more of an opportunity to separate the sheep from the
goats. Much of the difficulty, it was alleged, lay in over-
particularization,
What Congress -did was to retain the reorganization set-
up with slightly more restricted coverage and even greater
particularization. The old parenthetical clause which gave
such broad, meaning -to mergers and consolidations was
dropped. At first nothing was substituted; since at the
same. time the word "statutory" was inserted before
"mergers and consolidations", this threatened to make the
statute discriminatory, at least geographically, -since a
number of States and, ironically, the District of Columbia
.had'no merger statutes. To avoid this it was therefore nec-
essary to add the solely-for-voting-stock class of reorgani-
zation, that is, the acquisition of at least. 80 percent of the
stock or substantially all the assets of another corporation
solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation. In
addition to this narrowing of, the basic definition, there
was a tightening up of other provisions. It was alleged
that'one of the most conspicuous tax-avoidance tools was
the privilege of distributing reorganization stock as a divi-
dend without requiring the surrender of any old stock. The
Section granting this privilege. was repealed2' and was. not
restored until the Revenue Act of 1951.' Finally, the
Footnote. 21 and 22 on page 630.
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carry-over basis rule for acquiring corporations was ap-
plied to all cases regardless of the extent of the interest or
control remaining in the former owners.
Broadly speaking, this was the form of the statutory law
when the framers of the 1954 Code set to work. Meanwhile
two judicial doctrines had grown up in an attempt to con-
fine the operation of the reorganization provisions to
cases which met the test of their basic philosophy. These
were the business purpose and the continuity of interest
rules. The former is essentially a rule against sham trans-
actions; the latter is a conceptual approach and holds that,
unless a substantial proprietary interest, as opposed, for
example, to a creditor interest, is retained by the old own-
ers in the new enterprise, the underlying requirements of
the reorganization concept have not been satisfied. In
addition, the Supreme Court had greatly restricted certain
types of recapitalizations pursuant to which part of a
shareholder's interest was upgraded into bonds or deben-
tures for the purpose of subsequent redemption at capital
gains rates."3 A direct distribution of such instruments
would be a dividend. The Court held that the cloak of a
purported recapitalization was an ineffective disguise. Per-
21 The offending section had come into the statute in 1924 on the ground
that it represented only one of three ways to accomplish exactly the same
thing and, since the other two could be used without recognition of gain,
so should it be possible for this one to be. Since the repealer was only of
the distribution provision and left the alternatives untouched, it seems to
have run to the means and not to the end, though the situation became
thoroughly confused because of the inferences that could be drawn from
old Section 115 (g) in partial redemption cases and the substance vs. form
argument that could be made in any divisive reorganization even where
the last step was the complete liquidation and dissolution of the old cor-
poration. Fortunately, one provision in the 1954 Code, Section 355, 68A STAT.
.113. now covers all three methods and, while it may be overoptimism to
say all differences have been eliminated, they should at least be reduced to
a minimum. See generally infra in the text.
22 Section 317, Revenue Act of 1951,65 STAT. 493, added Section 112 (b) (11)
and Section 113 (a) (23) to the 1939 Code to cover these "spin-off' transac-
tions under restrictions designed to prevent their use for tax-avoidance
purposes.
2 -3 Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
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haps the io-called Groman . and Bashford' rule could also
be laid to the desire to police the reorganization field and
keep it from getting out of hand, at a time when the ex-
cesses of earlier days and the frankly restrictive purpose
of the 1934 Act provisions were fully understood. Reduced
to its simplest terms, the Groman and Bash ford rule was
that, if the assets of the Y Corporation were being ac-
quired for stock of the X Corporation, they would-have to
go to and be retained by X and could not wind up in a
wholly-owned subsidiary of X either on a direct transfer
from Y or via X.
With the passage of time sentiment began to build up
for achieving greater certainty or outright change in 'these
areas. In addition other problems had accumulated to meet
which it was felt some statutory modifications were neces-
sary. Included in the dossier were such subjects as cor-
porate divisions involving a parting of the ways by con-
flicting groups of shareholders, creeping control in certain
acquisition-for-voting-stock cases, relaxation of the solely-
for-voting-stock requirement in property-acquisition cases,
liquidations followed by reincorporation, and certain bor-
derline cases which pointed up the conflict between re-
organization concepts, on the one hand, and liquidation
concepts, on the other.
A more detailed description of the 1954 Code as finally
enacted will show how these problems were met. Some of
the solutions have already been briefly indicated in the
thumbnail sketch set forth at the start pf this discussion.
Let us retrace our steps first to the definition of reorgani-
zation. Three parts were left unchanged from prior law -
those dealing with statutory mergers and consolidations,
recapitalizations, and mere changes in identity, form, or
place of incorporation, however effected. But those dealing
24 Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937).
25 Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
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with acquisitions solely for voting stock and with control
reorganizations were considerably revised.
The provision of prior law dealing with the acquisition
of stock of one corporation by another solely for its voting
stock was in the following terms:_
2 6
(1) The term "reorganization" means... (B) the acquisi-
tion by one corporation in exchange for all or a part of its
voting stock, of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock
and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of
all other classes of stock of another corporation ....
In any case in which the acquiring corporation already
owned 21 percent of the stock of the other corporation,
it was manifestly impossible to comply with this provision,
no matter how the 21 percent had been acquired. More-
over, though as little as 80 percent could qualify as a per-
mitted acquisition under clause (B), if more than that
was acquired in a single transaction it would all have to
be acquired for voting stock; in other words, it would not
be sufficient to acquire merely 80 percent for such con-
sideration, and to give non-voting stock, or bonds, or cash,
for the remainder. Under the new Code this solely-for-
voting-stock requirement still applies to the entire trans-
action, but the 80 percent minimum does not. Any acquisi-
tion solely for voting stock, no matter how small, will
qualify if after the acquisition (whether or not as a result
of it) the acquiring corporation is in control of the ac-
quired corporation, pursuant to the general definition. The
proposed regulations take the view that the "single trans-
action" may be a stretched-out affair, covering as much
as twelve months.27 A six-month continuing offer by a
corporation to exchange its own voting stock for stock of
26 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 112 (g) (1) (B), 53 STAT. 40 (1939).
27 Proposed regulations under subchapter C, § .1.368-2(c). Actually the
regulations speak of a single transaction or a series of transactions. Since
it all has to be pursuant to a reorganization plan, however, the two terms in
this context appear to be synonymous.
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another corporation is given as an example. This can, of
course, be very helpful. It lets the earlier acquisitions in
the series qualify, though they could not on their own,
because the requisite control does not come into being
until the last few acquisitions. It could also be disadvan-
tageous. A lone acquisition during the period of the "single
transaction" which is not solely for voting stock could be
the one rotten -apple that spoils the whole barrel.
An .esoteric result of this change may well be its effect
upon the acceptability to the Bureau of the Winston
Brothers case.' That case, which arose under the 1928 Act,
involved a situation where an acquiring corporation in a
parenthetical clause reorganization already owned stock
in the corporation whose assets it wished to acquire. It
nevertheless purported to issue its own stock for all the
assets of the to-be-acquired corporation. Upon the dis-
solution of that corporation the issuing corporation, of
course, received a portion of its own stock back. The Com-
missioner took the position that substance should prevail
over form and that the assets which underlay the acquiring
corporation's stock interest were not acquired for its own
stock, but by way of liquidation. Hence it was not a quali-
fying reorganization. The Courts rejected the Commission-
er's analysis and held for the taxpayer. While the Bureau
originally non-acquiesced in the decision of the Board of
Tax Appeals,29 not only was the non-acquiescence later
withdrawn and acquiescence substituted 0 but the Bureau
affirmatively approved a similar transaction under the
1932 Act in G.C.M. 21873." In fact, this ruling went even
further and permitted the acquiring corporation to avoid
the step of issuing so much of its own stock as it would
receive back by giving a waiver.
29 Helvering v. Winston Bros. Co., 76 F2d 381 (8th Cir. 1935).
29 XIII-2 CuM. BuLL. 38 (1934).
30 1941-1 Cui. BuLL. 11.
31 1940-2 CuM. BULL. 223.
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In recent years, however, the. Bureau has been taking
the position, without publishing it until last year,3 2 that
the changed definition of a reorganization in the 1934 Act
made the Winston Brothers case inapplicable thereafter.
Why this should be true has never been clear, and the
1954 ruling says nothing to make it so. To the uninitiated
the Bureau appears to be repudiating rather than distin-
guishing its prior position. Admittedly the Winston Broth-
ers case would not qualify after 1934 on its facts (voting
stock was not the sole consideration), but the principle -
that the acquisition was not by way of liquidation, but for
stock -if valid prior to 1934, was valid thereafter. The
Bureau's real reason is believed to be that it was unwilling
to recognize the validity of such a circumvention unless
the acquiring corporation could have acquired the rest
of the other corporation's stock tax-free and then liqui-
dated the corporation under the intercorporate liqui-
dation provisions, also tax-free. Prior to the 1954 Code,
this could be done only if the stock already owned was 20
percent or less, for there had to be at least 80 percent
outstanding in the hands of others to be acquired. But,
since under the 1954 Code the only test is whether the
acquiring corporation has control after the clause (B)
acquisition, it is always theoretically possible to route the
transaction that way. Perhaps, therefore, if we have cor-
rectly read between the lines, the Bureau will be able to
see its way clear to withdraw its objections to the Win-
ston Brothers technique. This is about as good an example
as may be found of the hidden ways of reorganization law.
The clause (C), or assets-for-voting-stock, type of re-
organization was also liberalized. Looking at the clause
itself, the only apparent change lies in permitting voting
stock of a corporation in control of the transferee, in lieu
of that of the transferee itself, to be employed, but it must
32 Rrv. Rum. 54-396, 1954-38 I=. REv. BuLL. 9.
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be one or the other and not both. Thus, the Groman. and
Bashford cases are overruled. To take care of cases where
the assets are routed through the parent, Section 368
(a) (2) (C)33 provides that a Section 368(a) (1) (C)
transaction shall not be disqualified by reason of a trans-
fer of all or part of the assets acquired to a controlled cor-
poration. This rule also covers Section 368 (a) (1) (A)'
cases, that is, statutory mergers and consolidations. Note
that in the direct case all the acquired assets must go to the
subsidiary, whereas in the indirect case it is possible to di-
vide them. Let us hope there are not too many instances
of lack of sophistication penalized.
Two other major changes in clause (C) appear in -a
subordinate paragraph, headed "Special Rules Relating To
Paragraph (1)". The first of these provides 'merely that
if a given transaction is described both in clause (C) and
in clause (D), it shall be treated only as described in clause
(D). This is to insure the application of the proper share-
holder provision. The other relaxes the solely-for-voting-
stock requirement, permitting as much as 20 percent of
the assets to be acquired for other types of consideration
- including types which may result in partial recognition
of gain. While the general rule in clause (C) reorganiza-
tions is that assumptions of liability are to be disregarded
in determining whether the sole consideration is voting
stock, if other consideration is employed, then, in deter-
mining whether the minimum of 80 percent of the assets
is being acquired for voting stock, the liabilities assumed
are to be treated as money paid for the property. Thus
the new provision (that is, the rule permitting considera-
tion other than voting stock) is unavailable when assumed
liabilities equal or exceed 20 percent of the property ac-
quired and in other cases they reduce the amount of con-
33 INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 368 (a) (2) (C), 68A STAT. 121 (1954).
34 ia. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C), 68A STX. 120 (1954).
35 ibi.
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sideration other than voting stock that can be employed
pro tanto. As usual, the phrase "assumed liabilities" in-
cludes subject-to liabilities.
From 1924 to 1954 the definition of a control reorganiza-
tion remained unchanged and was as follows:36
(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets
to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the
transferor or its shareholders or both are in control of the
corporation to which the assets are transferred.
There was at least one type of transaction for which a
good case could be made that was not covered by this
definition. Let us assume the X Corporation, owned equal-
ly by two shareholders, A and B, is engaged in two busi-
nesses, the drug store business and the hardware store
business, to use the Committee Report example. 7 The
businesses are of the same value. For some reason the
shareholders would like to split the corporation, giving
the drugstore business to A and the hardware store busi-
ness to B. To make the case even more appealing, we will
further assume that, upon the organization of X, the drug-
store business was contributed by A and the hardware
store business by B. It ought to have been possible to set
up a new Y Corporation with the hardware store assets,
for example, and distribute the Y stock to B in exchange
for his X stock without any recognition of gain.. But this
could not be done under the old law. It would not even
have been possible to set up two new corporations, Y and
Z, transferring one of the businesses to each, unless both
shareholders wound up with stock in each corporation.
The reason for this was that the control requirement of old
Section 112 (g) (1) (D) wpuld not have been satisfied. Ob-
viously control was not in the transferor, since the stock
of Y in the first case and of Y and Z in the second was dis-
36 IN'T. REv. CODE of 1939, § 112 (g) (1) (D).
37 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1954).
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tributed. It was not in the transferor's shareholders, since
the section meant all," not merely some, of them. The new
Code remedies this by rephrasing the control requirement
in terms of:3
... the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders (in-
cluding persons who were shareholders immediately before
the transfer), or any combination thereof ....
Whether the new language will afford opportunities for
manipulation, as where control of the transferee rests in
a minor shareholder of the transferor apart from the parti-
cular transaction and substantially all the assets are trans-
ferred, and what new strain may be put upon the con-
tinuity of interest doctrine, are matters to be disclosed by
future experience.4 ° The particular point may appear far-
fetched and may be modified by considerations of what
could be done in a statutory merger, but the history of
reorganizations is full of bizarre twists.
A second and even more far-reaching structural change
in the clause (D) definition is the addition of the require-
ment that the stock or securities of the transferee be dis-
tributed by the transferor in a-transaction to which Section
354,41 355,4 or 356 1 applies, i.e., in a non-recognition or a
partial non-recognitioi transaction. Why this requirement
the Committee Reports do not say. The transaction may
still qualify under clause (C) at the corporate level. Even
if it does not, non-recognition will be accorded to the
transferor under Section 351, and the only difference in
38 Perhaps a de minimis rule would permit minor deviations under some
circumstances, but this does not affect the general validity of the statement
made in the text.
39 TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, §'368(a) (1) (D), 68A STAT. 120 (1954).
40 See Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau, and Warren, The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Re-
organizations, 68 HAiv. L..REv. 393, 419 (1955).
41 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 354, 68A STAT. 112 (1954).
42 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 355, 68A STAT. 113 (1954).
43 IN r. REV. CODE of 1954, § 356, 68A 'STAT. 115 (1954).
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result will be that earnings and profits will not go over to
the transferee. It is at the.shareholder level that the change
is of greatest importance. Though this is tied in with the
details of the new spin-off, split-off, and split-up provision
(Section 355), the basic problem can be considered at this
time.
Take first a case where there will likely be little quarrel
with the result from the point of view of policy. The X
Corporation, with substantial earnings and profits, wishes
generally to liquidate, but a small portion of its business-it
wishes to retain in corporate form. It transfers that por-
tion of the business to a new Y Corporation, reduces the
rest of its assets to cash, and liquidates. This was a reorgan-
ization under the old law; gain was recognized to the share-
holders to the extent of the boot received and, to the ex-
tent of the X Corporation's earnings and profits, was taxed
to them as a dividend.4 This was undeniably a harsh result
and, even with no change in the definition of a clause (D)
reorganization or the shareholder-exchange provision,
might not be reached under the 1954 Code, in view of the
inferences to be drawn from the" new partial liquidation
provisions on the question of distributions equivalent to a
dividend.' But it is unnecessary to rely on this approach.
The distribution to X's shareholders will not qualify under
Section 354, 355, or 356, for Section 354 is applicable only
to reorganizations where substantially all the assets of one
corporation are acquired by another, Section 355 applies
only where either the distributing corporation (X) is in
business after the distribution or it had no assets prior to
the distribution other than stock of controlled corpora-
tions, and Section 356 is merely the boot provision that
goes with Sections 354 and 355. The transaction is there-
44 Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
45 See the first instalment of this article, Peterson, Corporate Distribu-
tions and Adjustments-Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
30 NoTRa DAM LAw. 191, 217-219 (1955).
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fore not under clause (D). For the same reasons that
Section 354 is inapplicable to the shareholder exchange, it
is not under clause (C). There are no rules left to apply
to the shareholders except the liquidation rules. The share-
holders will thus receive capital gains treatment, but the
taxable gain will include all the gain on the liquidation
including that attributable to the value of the Y stock.
Consider, however, the result if the sole shareholder of the
X Corporation were the Z Corporation. The liquidation
would then appear to be covered by Section 33246 and
there would be no recognition of gain whatever - still
not an inappropriate result.
The foregoing results, i.e., a liquidating distribution
rather than a reorganization exchange, can be produced
by other sets of circumstances which disqualify the basic
transaction as a reorganization. To go to the other extreme,
suppose that 60 percent of the assets of the W Corporation
are business assets and 40 percent consist of cash not
needed in the business. If the cash were distributed to
shareholders, there would be a taxable dividend. W
transfers its business assets to a new V Corporation for all
of V's stock and liquidates. May the shareholders thereby
obtain capital gains treatment, at the price only of being
taxed on the appreciation, if any, in their remaining in-
vestment in the business? It is one thing to hold, as the
Gregory case47 did, that a transaction is not a reorganiza-
tion because it is a sham transaction and another to hold
that a transaction is a reorganization because it is a sham
transaction, particularly in the face of a rule that the
reorganization provisions are to be construed narrowly
and where they in terms exclude the transaction in
question. Perhaps so bald a case as this could be defeated
by an adaptation of the step transaction rule, for the end
46 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 332, 68A STAT. 102 (1954).
47 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 US. 465 (1935).
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result is merely the distribution of a dividend and all that
is required is to ignore the intervening steps.
One other type of transaction deserves to be considered
in order fully to appreciate the scope of the 1954 change
in the definition of a clause (D) reorganization. The P
Corporation has two businesses, into one of which it
wishes to bring new interests. For valid reasons it also
wishes to put the other business into a new corporation. It
therefore transfers one business to a new Q Corporation in
exchange for all of Q's stock. The other business it trans-
fers to a new R. Corporation .for 50 -percent of R's stock,
money and other property being transferred to the R Cor-
poration by outside interests for the remainder of its stock.
When this is accomplished P liquidates. Though P's trans-
fers to Q and R are tax-free at the corporate level because
of Section 351, its distribution of the Q and R stock to its
shareholders appears to be a taxable liquidation (or tax-
free, if P is owned by another corporation). The organiza-
tion of R is obviously not a reorganization, because neither
P nor its shareholders are in control of R nor did P trans-
fer substantially all its assets to R for R's voting stock. This
also prevents the transfer to Q from being a reorganiza-
.tion, despite the fact that, looked at alone, it appears to be.
It cannot qualify under clause (C) for the same reason
that the transfer to R does not and it fails to qualify under
clause (D) because the distribution to shareholders is non-
qualifying, P not remaining in business or owning, im-
mediately prior to the distribution, only stock of controlled
corporations. Under prior law the result would have been
completely different: there would have been a reorgani-
zation, though the R stock would have constituted boot to
the shareholders and its distribution as part of the plan
would probably have defeated non-recognition of the R
transaction even at the corporate level.
Before shifting to shareholder problems, some of which
have already been anticipated, reference should be made
[Vol. XXX
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in passing of the subject of liquidation followed by reincor-
poration. An approach was made to the problem in Section
35748 of the House Bill, though many questions, such as
how to handle taxes previously .paid, were left unan-
swered. But the provision was dropped in the Senate and
the omission was agreed to in Conference. The Conference
Report stated:49
The House bill in section 357 contained a provision dealing
with a device whereby it has been attempted to withdraw
corporate earnings at capital gains rates by distributing all
the assets of a corporation in complete liquidation and
promptly reincorporating the. business assets. This provision
gave rise to certain technical problems and it has not been
retained in the bill as recommended by the accompanying
conference report. It is the belief of the managers on the
part of the House that, at the present time, the possibility
of tax avoidance in this area is not sufficiently serious to
require a special statutory provision. It is believed that
this possibility can appropriately be disposed of by judicial
decision or by regulation within the framework-of the other
provisions of the bill.
In view of past experience with the courts in this area, this
confidence is somewhat surprising, The difficulties are not
diminished by the problems in clause (D) reorganizations
discussed above. But perhaps the bluff will work.
On the subject of shareholder treatment we have al-
ready referred to one major change from prior law, the
.treatment of securities as boot except to the extent an
equal principal amount of securities is surrendered. 'It is
important but need not be discussed further. From the
Government's point of view it completes the Bazley carr-
paign. The other major -change is with reference to spin-
offs, split-offs, and split-ups. The distinction between these
mystifying terms is no longer of any but intellectual inter-
est, since it is unnecessary now to distinguish between
them. They all relate to corporate divisions. If a corpora-
48 House Bill Section 357, H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1954).
49 IMR. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
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tion with two businesses sets up one of them in a new cor-
poration and distributes the stock of that corporation with-
out taking back any of its own, it is a spin-off. If it takes
back some of its own stock, i.e., adopts the form of a par-
tial liquidation, it is a split-off. If, instead of setting up one
new corporation, it sets up two, one for each business, and
then liquidates, it is a split-up. All are economically the
same thing.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1924 the statute contained
only an exchange provision at the shareholder level. In-
deed, on the surface it is difficult to see how a distribution
provision could have served any practical function, since
the clause (D) type of reorganization was not included in
the definition of reorganization until that Act. Neverthe-
less, the Committee Reports speak of divisive reorganiza-
tions as being permitted under prior law and point to the
necessity for a distribution provision at the shareholder
level in order that spin-offs be treated the same as split-offs
and split-ups, the latter already being tax-free.' The pro-
vision was a simple one and stated merely:
(c) If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorgan-
ization, to a shareholder in a corporation a party to the re-
organization, stock or securities in such a corporation or in
50 H.R. RE'. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1924). At the same time, on page 16 of the House Report
and page 17 of the Senate Report, in connection with the revised definition
of reorganizations, the addition of the control type is stated to be a change
from *prior law, though it is also referred to as "a common type of reor-
ganization." While subsidiaries could be organized under the tax-free
organization provisions of prior law, putting such stock in the hands of the
transferor's shareholders would not seem to have been possible, unless the
transaction was likewise a reorganization, both because the control require-
ment of the organization provision would not have been satisfied (see the
discussion of section 351, supra) and because the shareholder exchange
provision spoke only of reorganization exchanges. The only explanation that
remains is that, in defining a reorganization, the 1921 Act said "includes"
rather than "means" and that a corporate division was so obvious a type
of reorganization as not to require recital. With the use of "means" in the
1924 Act a complete spelling out was required. While at this distance and in
the absence of direct authority one can only -speculate, the opinion in
Insurance & Title Guarantee Co. v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.
1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 748 (1930), plainly supports this conclusion.
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another corporation a party to the reorganization, without
the surrender by such shareholder of stock or securities in
such a corporation, no gain to the distributee from the re-
ceipt of such stock or securities shall be recognized.
Came the 1934 upheaval and, as has already been in-
dicated, this provision was eliminated on the ground it
constituted one of the most notorious avenues of tax-
avoidance. Where did this leave the law? One answer was
that it left the law where it was prior to 1924--that only
spin-offs were taxable at the shareholder level, while split-
offs and split-ups were still tax-free. At the opposite ex-
treme it could be argued that all three were now ruled out,
split-offs because, with Section 115 (g)51 in the law to
cover redemptions essentially equivalent to a dividend (it
did not appear as a general provision until 1926), a pro
rata redemption of the transferor's stock was to be treated
as a distribution rather than an exchange, and split-ups
because they too were essentially the same thing. Which
stock that was handed out in a split-up should be treated as
the distribution and which as really stock of the old cor-
poration might have presented a problem, but it could al-
ways be solved in favor of the maximum tax liability. In
general, what the Bureau did was to continue to allow
split-ups, but to ban split-offs as well as spin-offs. The fact
that in 1952 the Bureau's split-off rule was rejected52 does
not mean that the Bureau's views were not the practical
law of the land during the entire period a tax-free distri-
bution provision was out of the statute.
Taxpayers lay low for some time, but after the war
began to advocate restoration of a tax-free distribution
provision to the law. It was suggested that the Bureau and
the courts had become much more astute to prevent abuse
of the reorganization provisions than they had been in the
51 See Revenue Act of 1926, § 201(g), 44 STAT. 11 (1926). Cf. Revenue
Act of 1928, § 115 (g), 45 STAT. 822 (1928).
52 Chester E. Spangler, 18 T.C. 976 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 6;
R~v. RUL. 289, 1953-2 Cu . BULL. 37.
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1920's and that, with the Gregory case on the books,'3 and
with a few precautionary limitations in the provision it-
self, it could safely be restored. Though for the next few
years such a provision was in and out of various revenue
bills, it was not until the Revenue Act of 1951 that tax-
payers' mission was accomplished. Section 317 of that Act
added Section 112(b) (11)" 4 to the 1939 Code permitting
tax-free distributions connected with reorganizations in
certain cases. Three limitations were imposed. First only
common stock could be so distributed; a distribution of
preferred stock or securities continued to be taxable. Sec-
ond, it must not appear that any corporation a party to
the reorganization was not intended to continue the active
conduct of a trade or business after the reorganization.
Third, it must likewise not appear that the corporation
whose stock was distributed was used principally as a
device for the distribution of earnings and profits to the
shareholders of any corporation a party to the reorganiza-
tion. Under this provision, if the business to be spun off
was already in the form of a subsidiary, the stock of the
subsidiary could not be distributed directly, but a new
holding company had to be created, to which the stock of
the subsidiary would be transferred, and the stock of
the holding company spun-off to the shareholders. More-
over, the holding company would have to be continued,
for an immediate merger with its operating subsidiary,
whether upstream or downstream, would reflect back on
the original transaction as a direct distribution of the sub-
sidiary's stock, which was barred. How the creation of a
holding company would satisfy the active business test
may seem strange. Ordinarily the Bureau would have re-
sisted such a construction tooth and nail., But its hands
53 In fact, in some quarters it was commonly stated that, had the Gregory
case been decided earlier, the old distribution provisions might never have
been eliminated.
54 INr. REv. CODE of 1939, § 112(b) (11), added by 65 STAT. 493 (1951).
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were tied by the Committee Report, which stated that just
such a case was intended to qualify-"whether or not [the
subsidiary was] wholly or even majority owned."55 The
Bureau squared itself with its conscience by taking the
position in the regulations that a corporation could be re-
garded as being engaged in the active conduct of a trade
or business if it: "
... indirectly conducts the business through ownership of
stock in another corporation actively conducting the business,
which other corporation is a subsidiary (whether or not
majority-owned) of the corporation, a party to the reorgani-
zation. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, a corpora-
tion is considered a subsidiary of another corporation if a
majority of its voting stock is owned by the other corpora-
tion or if a part of its stock (whether or not a majority of its
voting stock) is owned by the other corporation under such
circumstances that the policies of the first corporation are di-
rected by the second corporation.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 contains an entire-
ly new shareholder provision covering both exchanges
and distributions connected with corporate divisions. It is
narrower than the old provision in some respects and
broader in others. It is narrower in according non-recogni-
tion treatment only where the spun-off57 business is in the
form of a controlled corporation, i.e., 80 percent owned,
and in a much greater articulation of the test relative to
active conduct of a trade or business. It is broader in per-
mitting the spin-off of existing subsidiaries directly, in
allowing-indeed, requiring in most cases-that all the
stock and securities of the controlled corporation be dis-
tributed or exchanged, in recognizing non-pro-rata distri-
butions, whereby one business can go to one group of
shareholders and another to another, and in relaxing the
55 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, pp. 57-58 (1951).
56 U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b) (11) -2(b) (1953).
57 We shall hereafter use the spin-off language to embrace all three
types of corporate division.
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rule against sales of the spun-off or retained stock."8 On
the subject of securities it is well to repeat that they can
be received tax-free only to the extent an equivalent prin-
cipal amount of securities is surrendered. As to the treat-
ment of boot, the tax consequences differ somewhat de-
pending upon whether the transaction is a distribution or
an exchange. If it is a distribution, the boot is treated as a
property distribution to which Section 301' applies, i.e.,
it will be a dividend or a return of capital in accordance
with the state of the distributing corporation's earnings
and profits account." If it is an exchange, the gain limita-
tion applies, that is to say, though the recognized gain is
measured by the boot, it cannot exceed the realized gain,
and the amount which may be taxed as a dividend will be
similarly limited.
Two aspects of the new provision (Section 355) require
further comment: the active business requirement and
the requirement that the transaction is not a device for the
distribution of earnings and profits. Taking first the active
business requirement, we find that it in turn has two
facets, first, the requirement itself and, second, the defini-
tion of the term. The general requirement, as has been
mentioned previously in passing, is that either (1) both
the distributing corporation and the controlled corpora-
tion or corporations whose stock is distributed must be
actively engaged in business immediately after the distri-
bution, or (2) immediately before the distribution: 6
... the distributing corporation had no assets other than
stock or securities in the controlled corporations and each
5S The Bureau construed the rule of. the old law that the corporation
whose stock was distributed must not be used as a device for the distribu-
tion of earnings and profits as prohibiting immediate sale.
59 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 301, 68A STAT. 84 (1954).
60 The effect of an allocation of earnings and profits as between the
various corporations involved, as provided by Section 312(i), 68A STAT. 98
(1954), is as yet unexplored.
61 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 355 (b) (1) (B), 68A STAT. 114 (1954).
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of the controlled corporations is engaged immediately after
the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business.
The first appears to present no problems at this writing ex-
cept one which arises out of the definition of active con-
duct of a trade or business. The second, which is obviously
the complete liquidation provision, is troublesome because
of its reference to controlled corporations in the plural.
Does this mean that the holding company of a single con-
trolled subsidiary cannot avail itself of Section 355 for
purposes of a tax-free liquidation whereas the holding
company of two or more such subsidiaries can? It is pos-
sible that the use of the plural was inadvertent, since the
draftsmen were doubtlessly thinking in terms of corporate
divisions and did not visualize this case, but the proposedf
regulations do nothing to clarify the situation, confining
themselves to a paraphrase, if not an exact quotation, of
the statutory language-unless some special significance
attaches to the opening sentence of such regulations, which
describes the scope of Section 355 as follows:"
Section 355 provides for the separation, without recogni-
tion of gain or loss to the shareholders and security holders,
of two or more existing businesses formerly operated by a
single corporation.
In general, a corporation is regarded as engaged in the
active conduct of a trade or business if it is conducting a
business directly or if substantially all of its assets consist
of the stock of a controlled subsidiary which is so en-
gaged.' The business in question must have been con-
ducted by someone for a period of at least five years. If
62 Proposed regulations under subchapter C, § 1.355-1(a).
63 Note the singular in. this case as opposed to the plural in Section
355(b) (1) (B), 68A STAT. 114 (1954). If both are intended, then, reading the
two requirements described in the preceding paragraph of the text together,
we are forced to conclude that a pure holding company must have more
than one controlled subsidiary and must distribute either the stock of all
of them or the stock of all but one. On the surface this appears to be
irrational.
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acquired by the taxpayer or any member of the chain of
controlled corporations within five years, it must have
been in a tax-free transaction. Similar rules apply to ac-
quisitions of control where the active business test is
sought to be met derivatively, and stock acquired within
five years in other than a tax-free transaction is ineligible
for distribution tax-free. Thus, the practical control test
contained in the old regulations has not survived, even
for purposes of meeting the active business test, and safe-
guards have been erected to block the conversion of liquid
assets into an active business for purposes of tax-free dis-
tribution.
Underlying the verbal structure of the active business
test is the problem of identification of the business and its
separateness in relation to other activities of the taxpayer.
The necessity for doing this arises out of the five-year
requirement. Under the old law presumably it would
have been possible for a manufacturing corporation to
separate its fixed investment from its operations by creat-
ing a separate corporation to conduct one activity or the
other and distributing the stock of that corporation to its
shareholders. Under the new law as interpreted by the
Bureau in tentative regulations,' such a spin-off would
apparently not be possible, at least until five years after
segregation has taken place by creation of a subsidiary.
The proposed regulationss5 state first that:
... a trade or business consists of a specific existing group
of activities being carried on by a corporation or individual
for the purpose of earning income or profit from only those
specific activities. Such group of activities ordinarily must
include the collection of income and the payment of expenses.
Various exclusions are then listed, consisting of the hold-
ing of property for investment purposes, groups of activi-
ties which, while a part of a business operated at a profit,
64 Proposed regulations under subchapter C, § 1.355-1(c) and (d).
bid.
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are not themselves producing income, ande
... ownership and operation of land or buildings all, or sub-
stantially all, of which are used and occupied by the owner
in the operation of a trade or business.
Nine examples are given illustrating both compliance and
non-compliance. There may be a tendency to criticize the
Bureau for undue narrowness, but it is believed that, in
the fixed-assets type of case, both conceptually and as a
matter of definition the Bureau is probably right. To take
the partial liquidation analogy, should distribution of a
factory building, which the shareholders will then lease to
their company, be properly classified as a liquidating distri-
bution? Perhaps taxpayers are fortunate that, in the spin-
off field, the possibility exists that they need wait only five
years after separation through the creation of a subsidiary.
In other aspects of the definition there may be more ques-
tion from the point of view of policy, as, for example,
where it is sought to divide up a vertically integrated busi-
ness, but the question is one of legislative, not administra-
tive, policy and the restrictions lie in the language of the
statute. Before we leave the question of the definition of a
trade or business, it would also be well to note again the
problem of lack of continuity because of changes in the
taxpayer's business substantial enough to constitute the
acquisition of a new or different business. 7
As in the case of the former provision, an over-all limi-
tation on the operation of the section is that: '
... the transaction was not used principally as a device for
the distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing
corporation or the controlled corporation or both ....
This time there is added, however, the following paren-
86 Ibid.
67 Peterson, op. cit. supra note 35, at 219; proposed regulations under
subchapter C, § 1.355-4(b) (3).
68 I. REv. CODE of 1954, § 355 (a) (1) (B), 68A STAT. 113 (1954).
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thetical clause: 69
... (but the mere fact that subsequent to the distribution
stock or securities in one or more of such corporations are
sold or exchanged by all or some of the distributees (other
than pursuant to an arrangement negotiated or agreed upon
prior to such distribution) shall not be construed to mean
that the transaction was used principally as such a device).
Had the parenthesis within the parenthesis been omitted
we would have had a much more logical provision. As it
stands, a sale pursuant to prior negotiations or agreement
may, of itself, cause the distribution to become disquali-
fied, but the taxpayer ought to be permitted to argue his
case. The main purpose of the parenthetical clause was to
negative an inference. The inclusion of an exception ought
not to create one. It ought merely to leave the case where
it would be if there had been no parenthetical clause at
all. But, beyond this, it is illogical. The whole point of the
parenthetical clause is that the spin-off problem is merely
an aspect of the partial liquidation problem. Since in the
main the partial liquidation tests and the spin-off tests are
the same and since by definition a partial liquidation is not
a distribution of earnings and profits in a dividend sense,
a sale of spun-off or retained stock, whether or not pur-
suant to prior agreement, will ordinarily not convert the
transaction into a device for such a distribution. Some-
thing more must be present. It would be better to focus on
the two respects in which a spin-off may differ from a par-
tial liquidation in the end-result. One of these is connected
with the bail-out problem dealt with in Section 306.70
Since under Section 355 preferred as well as common
stock may be distributed, such a transaction could be used
to set the stage for a bail-out. The other is that spin-offs
afford the opportunity for placing non-business assets in
a position to be liquidated out at capital gains rates with-
9 PBid.
70 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 306, 68A STAT. 90 (1954).
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out winding up the entire business. In a partial liquida-
tion only the business assets may be received at capital
gains rates; non-business assets distributed along with
them are taxed at dividend rates.
No description of the 1954 Code provisions dealing with
reorganizations would be complete without some refer-
ence to the provisions of the House Bill on the subject.
To describe them in their entirety would be unnecessarily
repetitious at many points, but there were some significant
innovations--dropped in the Senate-which deserve men-
tion. One of these was a quantitative continuity of interest
test, the so-called 25-400 percent rule. Except in the case
of statutory mergers or consolidations of publicly-held
companies,' tax-free combinations could take place only
if the shareholders of each constituent enterprise wound
up with at least a 20 percent interest in the combined en-
terprise, i.e., at least 25 percent of the interest of the share-
holders of any other participant, 400 percent being the re-
ciprocal. Acquisitions of stock of another corporation were
assimilated to acquisitions of assets by requiring a transfer
of the asset basis to the stock. Also the terms "participat-
ing stock" and "non-participating stock" were used and the
term "securities" defined. Apart from certain technical
defects, one result was to transfer certain types of income
debentures and subordinated debt from the category of
securities to the category of non-participating stock, with
the horrifying results of bringing them within the divi-
dend-equivalence provisions on redemption and denying
an interest deduction. Still another departure from prior
concepts was abandonment of the gain limitation in reor-
ganization exchanges at the shareholder level involving
boot, where dividend equivalence was present. Finally, on
7' A corporation was deemed to be publicly held unless ten or fewer
shareholders owned more than 50 percent either of the total combined vot-
ing power or of the total value of all classes of stock, the rules of construc-
tive ownership, discussed in the first part of this article, being fully ap-
plicable. House Bill Section 359 (a), H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1954).
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the subject of spin-offs, though there was no active business
requirement to impede the distribution, it was applied with
a vengeance with respect to the tax treatment of any
amounts received by shareholders or security holders
within ten years after the distribution upon the disposition
of spun-off stock or retained stock "by liquidation, sale,
redemption, or otherwise""2 or as distributions. If the cor-
poration was of a certain type, such amounts were treated
as ordinary income, unless for the five years preceding
such realization 90 percent or more of the corporation's
gross income had not been personal holding company in-
come. The concept employed for this purpose was that of
an inactive corporation. An inactive corporation was de-
fined as a corporation other than one whose business (for
which separate books and records must also have been
maintained) had been held for five years directly or in-
directly by the distributing corporation or, subsequent to
the distribution, by the corporation whose stock was dis-
tributed, provided also that 90 percent or more of the gross
income of such business for the five-year period was other
than personal holding company income. The curse of being
an inactive corporation could extend not only to the spun-
off corporation but also to the retained corporation.
We do not have the House Bill. But we do have enough
changes in detail from existing law, verbal and otherwise,
that, in a field where every comma counts, as it does in
the case of the law dealing with corporate distributions
and adjustments, lawyers, accountants, taxpayers, the
Bureau, and the courts will be kept busy for many years."
C. Rudolf Peterson*
72 House Bill Section 353 (b) (1), H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1954).
7 This is the third and final instalment of Mr. Peterson's article
Corporate Distributions and Adjustments-Subchapter C of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. Part I, Corporate Distributions, see 30 NOTRE DAM
LAw. 191 (1954), Part II, Corporate Liquidations, see 30 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 360 (1955).
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